Skills/npm/finstack-mcp-server

finstack-mcp-server@0.11.0-b85443c

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Finstack" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher crscreditapi · publishing for 257 daysInstalls 1,985Last detonated 15 min ago
$claude mcp add finstack-mcp-server -- npx -y @crscreditapi/finstack-mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FINSTACK_CHATBASE_SECRETTOOL_CALLS_DATABASE_URLTOOL_CALLS_PGPASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: FINSTACK_DEV_BASE_URL, FINSTACK_PROD_BASE_URL, FINSTACK_TIMEOUT_MS, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, TOOL_CALLS_PGDATABASE, TOOL_CALLS_PGHOST, TOOL_CALLS_PGPORT, TOOL_CALLS_PGSSL, TOOL_CALLS_PGUSER, TOOL_LOG, TOOL_RESULT_MAX_BYTES
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for FINSTACK_CHATBASE_SECRET, TOOL_CALLS_DATABASE_URL, TOOL_CALLS_PGPASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @crscreditapi/finstack-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.11.0-5e3bc3b

vet-skills diff finstack-mcp-server 0.11.0-5e3bc3b 0.11.0-b85443c

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.11.0-5e3bc3b did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.11.0-b85443c was run less far than 0.11.0-5e3bc3b (startup only vs full); behavior past startup is not compared. Only one of the two runs produced a tool list; tools are not compared.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 29 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
8.4sprocessdependency install exit 0
28sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-LcxuFV/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/finstack-mcp-server/dist/handlers/product_lookup.handler.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
28sprocessscript backend runs setup only
28sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.js:81 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconsole.error(`finstack-mcp-server running (http) on port ${port}`);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/api/support_ai.api.d.ts:8 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* an hourly cap per customer, a Flipper kill switch) and answers with anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.