drawing-anonymizer-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Anonymize drawing PDFs: mask names, logos, addresses, emails; flattened PDF or expiring link." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
IMNOO_ACCESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DRAWING_ANONYMIZER_URL- Where it talks to
- imnoo.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for IMNOO_ACCESS_TOKEN and talks to imnoo.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 2,382 lines in 5 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for drawing-anonymizer-mcp@0.1.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.