docker-mcp@1.0.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that enables AI agents to interact with Docker containers locally or remotely via SSH. Provides comprehensive Docker management capabilities including container operations, logs, monitoring, and cleanup." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DOCKER_MCP_PRIVATE_KEYSSH_AUTH_SOCKConfiguration, not credentials: DOCKER_MCP_HOST, DOCKER_MCP_LOCAL, DOCKER_MCP_PASSPHRASE, DOCKER_MCP_PORT, DOCKER_MCP_SERVER_NAME, DOCKER_MCP_SERVER_VERSION, DOCKER_MCP_SOCKET_PATH, DOCKER_MCP_TIMEOUT, DOCKER_MCP_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DOCKER_MCP_PRIVATE_KEY, SSH_AUTH_SOCK and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
/** SSH host name (as defined in ~/.ssh/config) or IP address */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Parse SSH config from ~/.ssh/config if availableFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.echo " ssh_host SSH host (as defined in ~/.ssh/config or user@host format)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.DOCKER_MCP_PRIVATE_KEY=~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.DOCKER_MCP_PRIVATE_KEY=~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Direct SSH connection (uses ~/.ssh/config if configured)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for docker-mcp@1.0.0 as of 36 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.