devtools-mcp@0.64.22
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "MCP↔devtools bridge for GJS apps — exposes a running app's org.gjsify.Devtools control plane (DBus) to an AI agent as MCP tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
`)}function parseArgv(e){let t=[],n=new Map;for(let r=0;r<e.length;r++){let i=e[r];if(!i.startsWith(`--`)){t.push(i);continue}let a=i.indexOf(`=`);if(a!==-1){n.set(i.slice(2,a),i.slice(a+1));continue}Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.import"../_virtual/_rolldown/runtime.js";import{fail as e,image as t,ok as n}from"../tool-result.js";import{GjsStdioTransport as r}from"../stdio-transport.js";import{NsCdpClient as i}from"../transportFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @gjsify/devtools-mcp@0.64.22 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.