cubil@0.1.7
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Install the cubil task-management skill into OpenCode, and the cubil binary if it is missing" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.1.6
vet-skills diff cubil 0.1.6 0.1.7This version reaches for something 0.1.6 did not: 1 new host (githubusercontent.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- githubusercontent.com
0.1.6 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
process.stderr.write(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh\n`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process.stderr.write(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh\n`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process.stderr.write(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh\n`)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @frantufro/cubil install [options]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @frantufro/cubil@0.1.7 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim frantufro: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.