Skills/npm/cubil

cubil@0.1.7

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Install the cubil task-management skill into OpenCode, and the cubil binary if it is missing" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher frantufro · publishing for 82 daysInstalls 242Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.6

vet-skills diff cubil 0.1.6 0.1.7

This version reaches for something 0.1.6 did not: 1 new host (githubusercontent.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
githubusercontent.com

0.1.6 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellbin/install.mjs:321 · Remote installer piped to shellprocess.stderr.write(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh\n`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternbin/install.mjs:321 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeprocess.stderr.write(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh\n`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLbin/install.mjs:321 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceprocess.stderr.write(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh\n`)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/install.mjs:31 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @frantufro/cubil install [options]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,113 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @frantufro/cubil@0.1.7 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim frantufro: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim frantufroPropose a patch to the maintainer