ctxlint@0.28.3
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "Linter for AI agent context files and MCP configs: CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursorrules, .mcp.json - catches broken paths, wrong commands, leaked secrets" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso oamjs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Do not connect it. The honeypot or a critical finding blocked this version; the evidence is below.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.28.2
vet-skills diff ctxlint 0.28.2 0.28.3In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.28.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.28.2 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 44/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Reads credential paths from the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
run: npx -y "@yawlabs/ctxlint@${CTXLINT_VERSION}" ${CTXLINT_ARGS}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."historyLocation": "~/.aws/amazonq/history/chat-history-*.json",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."historyLocation": "~/.aws/amazonq/history/chat-history-*.json",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…hell environment. Deliberately info severity: many env vars are set only in CI, .env files, or shell profiles unavailable during linting.", "trigger": "Env va…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.entry: npx @yawlabs/[email protected] --strictFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."globalConfig": "~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// signals: child.kill IGNORES the name and calls TerminateProcess -- anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."globalConfig": "~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.| `{count} always-loaded files total {N} tokens — loaded every session` |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.// child, so on Windows the timer below is the only kill we issue.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// immediate hard kill (verified: a child with a SIGTERM handler never runsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."message": "Server \"{name}\": npx requires \"cmd /c\" wrapper on Windows",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."trigger": "npx package is not in package.json dependencies/devDependencies and not in node_modules/.bin.",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."trigger": "Platform is Windows, command is \"npx\" (not \"cmd\" with /c npx in args).",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."description": "npx package is not in project dependencies.",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."description": "On Windows, npx commands in stdio configs require a cmd /c wrapper to spawn correctly.",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
36 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yawlabs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.