Skills/npm/corkcrm-mcp

corkcrm-mcp@0.55.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for corktasks.com (CorkCRM PM)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher corkcrm · publishing for 230 daysInstalls 9,275Last detonated 10 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CORK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CONVEX_URL, CORK_APP_URL, CORK_DOWNLOAD_DIR, CORK_MCP_NOW, CORK_MCP_WHOLE_ANSWERS, RESOURCE_METADATA_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso convex.site, corktasks.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names convex.site, corktasks.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CORK_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y corkcrm-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.53.0

vet-skills diff corkcrm-mcp 0.53.0 0.55.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.53.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.0sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · at getConvexUrl (file:///tmp/ks-detonate-pNJhOG/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/corkcrm-mcp/dist/auth.js:19:15) at file:///tmp/ks-detonate-pNJhOG/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/corkcrm-mcp/dist/index.js:18:16 at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:103:5) Node.js v22.23.5
27sprocessscript backend runs setup only
27sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:93 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst tmp = join(dir, `.credentials.${randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}.tmp`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/writeSchemas.js:213 · Destructive file system command detected// add_project_summary (alpha-8369). The summary is about, needs, and milestones (alpha-8595); parts, the formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/formatTree.js:69 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst rows = [...env.rows].sort((a, b) => (b.state_since ?? "").localeCompare(a.state_since ?? "") || a.name.localeCompare(b.name));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/format.js:289 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslines.push(...env.rows.map((r) => `- ${formatRow(r, { assigneeId, lead, where })}`));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detecteddist/descriptionFile.js:70 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentconst body = decoded.replace(/^/, "").replace(/\r\n/g, "\n");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.d.ts:17 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… saves it to\n ~/.config/corktasks/credentials.json, readable only by you (0600).\n --url is the Convex site URL, ending .convex.site; it defaults to\n CONVEX_URL, then to the URL already saved, then to https://hip-dog-509.convex.site.\n c…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/formatTree.js:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env.rows.map((r) => `${number(r.simple_id)} ${bars([oneLine(r.name), r.project_state?.name ?? "no state", r.project_type?.name])}`),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈46 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim corkcrm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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