Skills/npm/core

core@24.1.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Standalone MCP server for SAP ABAP ADT over stdio: one destination through the auth broker (service keys, sessions, the browser login); connects to the system over HTTP, RFC or SNC (passwordless). RFC and SNC need the SAP NW RFC library at run time. Strea" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mcp-abap-adt · publishing for 366 daysInstalls 9,941Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add core -- npx -y @mcp-abap-adt/core
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @mcp-abap-adt/core

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 23.1.0

vet-skills diff core 23.1.0 24.1.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 23.1.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 35 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
15sprocessdependency install exit 0
35sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · [MCP] Inspection-only mode (no destination): the SAP system type is required, because the tools listed are those of its ADT type table — set --system-type, SAP_SYSTEM_TYPE (the environment) or system-type (YAML) to onprem, cloud or legacy; the server did not start
35sprocessscript backend runs setup only
35sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 1,069 lines in 13 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈100 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @mcp-abap-adt/core@24.1.1 as of 37 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.