Skills/npm/converse-mcp-server

converse-mcp-server@4.9.12

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Converse MCP Server - Converse with other LLMs with chat and consensus tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher falldownthesystem · publishing for 476 daysInstalls 6,029Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add converse-mcp-server -- npx -y converse-mcp-server
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYAPI_KEY_ENV_VARSCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKENCLEF_CONTEXT_TOKENSMAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENSConfiguration, not credentials: ASYNC_CACHE_DIR, ASYNC_DISK_TTL_MS, ASYNC_MEMORY_TTL_MS, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, CLIENT_CWD, CODEX_HOME, COPILOT_CLI_PATH, INIT_CWD, MCP_TRANSPORT, npm_config_local_prefix, Path
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, antigravity.google, typesafe.ai, cloudflare.com, abliteration.ai, deepseek.com, x.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, antigravity.google, typesafe.ai, cloudflare.com, abliteration.ai, deepseek.com, x.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, API_KEY_ENV_VARS, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, CLEF_CONTEXT_TOKENS, MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y converse-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 54 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
33sprocessdependency install exit 0
53sclaimed4 tools: chat, check_status, cancel_job, decide
53sprocessscript backend runs setup only
53sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.js:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv.config({ path: '.env.test', quiet: true });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/providers/gemini-cli.js:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Extra wall-clock grace before the JS-side hard kill fires (ms).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/localProviderAuth.js:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn existsSync(join(configDir, '.credentials.json'));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/providers/gemini-cli.js:532 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// then schedules a post-kill grace timer so we never hang if onExit neverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:93 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/converse.js:15 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// node builtins, so this stays a sub-100ms round trip for `npx converse -v`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/providers/claude.js:489 · Destructive file system command detected// Convert messages to SDK input formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.js:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from appropriate .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.js:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Priority: .env.test (for test env) > .env (default)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/ALTERNATIVE_PROVIDERS.md:293 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction fileprompt: '<s>[INST] Hello [/INST]',Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.js:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Fall back to .env for any missing variablesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 73 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈2,455 tok
4 tools · 614 per tool
Handshake
838 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 717

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for converse-mcp-server@4.9.12 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.