context7-mcp@4.6.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "MCP server for Context7" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AUTH_CHECK_PATHAUTH_SERVER_URLCONTEXT7_API_KEYMCP_AUTH_ENFORCEMENTMCP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_AUDIENCESMCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE_ENFORCEMENTMCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_VALIDATIONOAUTH_AUTH_SERVER_URLOAUTH_JWKS_URLOPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CONTEXT7_API_URL, CONTEXT7_RESEARCH_PREVIEW, EMA_ISSUER, EMA_JWKS_URL, MCP_CLIENT_IP_ASSERTION_KEY, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, RESOURCE_URL, VERCEL_MARKETPLACE_OIDC_AUDIENCE, VERCEL_MARKETPLACE_OIDC_ISSUER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso context7.com, microsoftonline.com, x.example, vercel.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names context7.com, microsoftonline.com, x.example, vercel.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AUTH_CHECK_PATH, AUTH_SERVER_URL, CONTEXT7_API_KEY, MCP_AUTH_ENFORCEMENT, MCP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES, MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE_ENFORCEMENT, MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_VALIDATION, OAUTH_AUTH_SERVER_URL, OAUTH_JWKS_URL, OPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 31 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
? `npx ctx7 setup ${flag} --mcp${transportFlag} -y`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.<summary><b>Install in Claude Code</b></summary> Run this command. See [Claude Code MCP docs](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/mcp) for more info.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b>Install in Amp</b></summary> Run this command in your terminal. See [Amp MCP docs](https://ampcode.com/manual#mcp) for more info. #### With OAuth ``Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."build": "tsc && chmod 755 dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.: `npx ctx7 setup --mcp${transportFlag}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @upstash/context7-mcp@4.6.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.