Skills/npm/commhub-server

commhub-server@0.9.0-preview.280

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "CommHub Server — AI Agent communication hub with MCP protocol, multi-network isolation, user auth, and MCP tools (17 collaboration-core + node/provider ops tools; authoritative list: docs-site/docs/api/mcp-tools.md)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher sleep2agi · publishing for 219 daysInstalls 51,811Last detonated 38 h ago
$claude mcp add commhub-server -- npx -y @sleep2agi/commhub-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEYCOMMHUB_AUTH_TOKENDATABASE_URLNODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDSESSION_TOKEN_SQLConfiguration, not credentials: ANET_EMBEDDED_COMMHUB_VERSION, COMMHUB_AGENT_SCHEDULE_QUOTA, COMMHUB_BOOT_BACKFILL_DELAY_MS, COMMHUB_CORS_ORIGINS, COMMHUB_DB, COMMHUB_DELIVERED_STALE_PATROL_MS, COMMHUB_DEV_OPEN, COMMHUB_ENABLE_TMUX, COMMHUB_LOG_RING, COMMHUB_MAX_NETWORKS_PER_USER, COMMHUB_NODE_FAILURE_ALERT_MS, COMMHUB_PG_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS, COMMHUB_PROJECT_NEW_SESSION_PREVIEW, COMMHUB_RATELIMIT_SWEEP_MS, COMMHUB_RETENTION_AUDIT_DAYS, COMMHUB_RETENTION_CHUNK_ROWS, COMMHUB_RETENTION_FIRST_DELAY_MS, COMMHUB_RETENTION_INBOX_ACKED_DAYS, COMMHUB_RETENTION_SWEEP_MINUTES, COMMHUB_RETENTION_TASK_EVENTS_DAYS, COMMHUB_RETENTION_TELEMETRY_DAYS, COMMHUB_SCHEDULER_TICK_MS, COMMHUB_SCRYPT_N, COMMHUB_SEND_DEDUP_MAX_KEYS, COMMHUB_SEND_DEDUP_WINDOW_MS, COMMHUB_SERVER, COMMHUB_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, COMMHUB_SLOW_SQL_MS, COMMHUB_SOURCE_DIRECTORY_PREVIEW, COMMHUB_SOURCE_FORK_PREVIEW, COMMHUB_STALE_CUTOFF_MINUTES, COMMHUB_STALE_SWEEP_SECONDS, COMMHUB_TASK_PATROL_MS, COMMHUB_TMUX_ALLOWLIST, COMMHUB_UPLOADS_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso mcp.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mcp.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANET_HUB_SECRET_VAULT_KEY, COMMHUB_AUTH_TOKEN, DATABASE_URL, NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED, SESSION_TOKEN_SQL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @sleep2agi/commhub-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.4sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-s8XoTg/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/commhub-server/src/server.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
27sprocessscript backend runs setup only
27sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/commhub.ts:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx @sleep2agi/commhub-server --port 9200Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/avatar-validate.ts:81 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking// Embedded credentials (https://user:pass@host/…) would be persisted,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/commhub.ts:6 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx @sleep2agi/commhub-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/commhub.ts:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx @sleep2agi/commhub-server --db ~/.commhub/commhub.dbFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/commhub.ts:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx @sleep2agi/commhub-server --dev-openFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/rest-identity.ts:15 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// Production network tokens pass tokenId and resolve through resolveNodeCaller.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/commhub.ts:8 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx @sleep2agi/commhub-server --port 9200 --token my-secretFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/db-adapter.ts:323 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("[commhub] PostgreSQL connection verified");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uploads.test.ts:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(sanitizeExt("../../etc/passwd.jpg")).toBe(".jpg");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uploads.test.ts:110 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(() => buildStoragePath("../etc/passwd", ".png", { uploadsRoot: "/srv" })).toThrow(/invalid/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools.ts:2316 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${ts()}] ${from_session} → send_task → ${targetAlias}: DROPPED duplicate (key=${dedup.kind}, age=${dedup.ageMs}ms, window=${sharedSendDedup.windowMs}ms)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.ts:4296 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…Array(rawRoutes) && routes.length === 0) { return withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "empty_allowlist_ambiguous", message: "send null to clear the allowlist (no restriction); an empty array is ambiguous and i…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/tools.ts:4431 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file"Ask a node to write a managed block into its rules file (CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md). Poll get_rules_file_result. User logins only (node owner or network owner/admin).",Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uploads.test.ts:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools.ts:2232 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${ts()}] 🚫 send_task: non-participant parent rejected, parent=${parentIn.slice(0, 8)} caller=${childFromAlias}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/tools.ts:1067 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// permission **一行 chmod go-w**Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.ts:4700 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_action", message: "action must be list | put | delete" }, { status: 400 }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools.ts:2215 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${ts()}] 🚫 send_task: cross-network parent rejected, parent=${parentIn.slice(0, 8)} parent-net=${parentRow.network_id ?? "null"} caller-net=${effectiveNetId ?? "null"}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools.ts:2278 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${ts()}] ${from_session} → send_task → ${targetAlias}: REPLAY (key=request_id, task=${existing.task_id.slice(0, 13)})`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/tools.ts:5737 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// §4.4 D7: daemon writes backup chmod 700, sweeper真删Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/db-adapter.ts:541 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("[commhub] database: PostgreSQL");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools.ts:2203 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${ts()}] ⚠ send_task: parent_task_id=${parentIn.slice(0, 8)} not found, dropping parent link`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.ts:4706 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "revision_required", message: "put/delete need the revision from the last list" }, { status: 400 }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uploads.test.ts:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(isPathInsideUploadsRoot("/srv/uploads/../etc/passwd", "/srv/uploads")).toBe(false);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uploads.test.ts:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(isPathInsideUploadsRoot("/etc/passwd", "/srv/uploads")).toBe(false);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/tools.ts:1092 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// chmod 掉也**永远上报 ready**。后者是朝「没问题」方向说谎。Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.ts:3134 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn withCors(req, Response.json(r, { status: req.method === "POST" ? 201 : 200 }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.ts:4290 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn withCors(req, Response.json({ ok: false, error: "invalid_routes", message: "routes must be an array of route labels like \"POST /api/task\", or null" }, { status: 400 }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈100 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @sleep2agi/commhub-server@0.9.0-preview.280 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.