codegraph-mcp@0.21.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "CodeGraph MCP server — cross-language code intelligence with 42 tools, 38 languages" Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso posthog.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 22 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
console.log("in workspaces. It NEVER blocks tool calls and produces no output for non-source files.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(" npx codegraph-mcp-install-hooks");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// succeeded and reporting a chmod failure as a download failure misleads.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.console.log(`✓ codegraph-mcp installed: ${output.trim().split("\n")[0]}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.warn(` Retry with: npx codegraph-mcp-fetch-engine`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @astudioplus/codegraph-mcp@0.21.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim astudioplus: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.