cli@1.6.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Connects Claude Code, Codex, pi and other coding agents to Phantom AI, an OpenAI-compatible API, and manages your keys, credit and spending caps from the terminal." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher phantomcodes · publishing for 33 daysInstalls 5,202Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.6.0

vet-skills diff cli 1.6.0 1.6.3

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.6.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/workspace/command.mjs:629 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// server would kill the recovery file, so a sign-in that is the recovery credential is only forgotten here.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:189 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><strong>Development and contributing</strong></summary> The CLI lives in `cli/` in the Phantom repo, which uses pnpm. Install once at the repo root, thFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/agents/proxy.mjs:18 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsexport function proxyToken() {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelldist/core/node-trust.mjs:23 · Remote installer piped to shell`curl -fsSL https://phantom.codes/install | sh, which brings its own.\n`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/agents/command.mjs:164 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsconst token = proxyToken();Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/agents/proxy.mjs:12 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials* it started: each request must carry the run's token ({@link proxyToken}),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/agents/command.mjs:16 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsimport { proxyToken, startProxy } from "./proxy.mjs";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/agents/proxy.mjs:46 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials* @param opts.token The run's secret ({@link proxyToken}). A request without it, as `Authorization: Bearer` or `x-api-key`, gets 401.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterndist/core/node-trust.mjs:23 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code`curl -fsSL https://phantom.codes/install | sh, which brings its own.\n`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/setup/agents.mjs:101 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// runs the helper outside this shell, so a relative or npx path won't do.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,990 tok
1 file · 49 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @phantomcodes/cli@1.6.3 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim phantomcodes: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim phantomcodesPropose a patch to the maintainer