cli@1.0.147

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Cargo, the go-to-market platform, from your terminal or coding agent: find and verify work emails, enrich companies and contacts, score leads and sync them to your CRM (HubSpot, Salesforce) across 130+ integrations, run plays and workflows, and serve it a" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher cargo-ai · publishing for 257 daysInstalls 134KLast detonated 4d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Unpinned dependencybuild/version.d.ts:1 · Unpinned dependencyexport declare const UPDATE_COMMAND = "npm install -g @cargo-ai/cli@latest";Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/commands/ai/message.js:19 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…andle. Compiles it, resolves its resource handles to real uuids from cargo.state.json, and sends the agent's prompt/tools/models/capabilities inline — no deploy. Rejected with…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/agentSkills.d.ts:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeexport declare const AGENT_SKILLS_HINT = "Coding agents: install the Cargo skills with `npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skills`";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/commands/auth/index.js:204 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinfo("If commands still work, the token is coming from CARGO_API_TOKEN or a project .env.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/agentSkills.js:38 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code" npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skills every command, as agent skills",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/commands/auth/index.js:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…CARGO_BASE_URL) take precedence over saved credentials, and the nearest project .env (walking up from the current directory) fills them in when they are not already…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/config.js:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Fold project `.env` into the environment first (never overriding explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/index.js:59 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeAny agent (skills.sh): npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skillsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellbuild/utils/prompt.js:5 · Remote installer piped to shell// Interactive prompts must not assume stdin is a terminal: `curl | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/index.js:64 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeAny agent (skills.sh): npx skills add getcargohq/gtm-skillsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/commands/hosting/app.js:163 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"cargo-ai hosting app env <appUuid> > .env.local",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/commands/hosting/app.js:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.option("--api-url <url>", "Override the API URL written to the .env (default: https://api.getcargo.io)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/agentSkills.js:22 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeexport const AGENT_SKILLS_HINT = "Coding agents: install the Cargo skills with `npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skills`";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Unpinned dependencybuild/version.js:10 · Unpinned dependencyexport const UPDATE_COMMAND = "npm install -g @cargo-ai/cli@latest";Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/agentSkills.js:39 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code" npx skills add getcargohq/gtm-skills standalone one-job GTM skills",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/commands/hosting/app.js:91 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// `env` is taken by the .env.local printer above.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/commands/hosting/app.js:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.description("Print the .env.local lines a local copy of the app needs (Cargo OAuth + workspace + app UUID + API URL).")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild/commands/doctor.js:59 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code? { fix: "npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skills" }Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternbuild/utils/prompt.js:5 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code// Interactive prompts must not assume stdin is a terminal: `curl | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈89 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @cargo-ai/cli@1.0.147 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Unpinned dependencies≈ +3 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cargo-aiPropose a patch to the maintainer