cli@0.86.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Your AI agents know the code. They don't know the company. Local CLI and MCP server that checks your coding agent's change against your team's decisions from Jira, Confluence, Linear, Notion, Slack, Teams, Zoom, GitHub, GitLab, git history and repo docs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher aligndottech · publishing for 179 daysInstalls 10,373Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ALIGN_LLM_API_KEYALIGN_TOKENALIGN_TOKEN_STOREConfiguration, not credentials: ALIGN_DEBUG, ALIGN_ENV, ALIGN_GATEWAY_URL, ALIGN_INTERNAL, ALIGN_LLM_BASE_URL, ALIGN_LLM_PROVIDER, ALIGN_LLM_TIMEOUT_MS, ALIGN_NO_SYNC, ALIGN_OLLAMA_MODEL, ALIGN_RULES_ACK, ALIGN_TENANT_ID, ALIGN_WRAPPED, COLORFGBG, OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH, OLLAMA_HOST, PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso align.tech, microsoft.com, atlassian.com, slack.com, linear.app, notion.com, git-scm.com, atlassian.net, evil.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names align.tech, microsoft.com, atlassian.com, slack.com, linear.app, notion.com, git-scm.com, atlassian.net, evil.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ALIGN_LLM_API_KEY, ALIGN_TOKEN, ALIGN_TOKEN_STORE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @aligndottech/cli

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Sends the whole process environment out; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 40 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
19sprocessdependency install exit 0
39sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-DBctdV/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/cli/dist/lib/node-floor.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
39sprocessscript backend runs setup only
39sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/local-llm.js:664 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// `||`, not `??`: OLLAMA_HOST='' (a stock .env template, an unset compose variable)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/lib/mcp-env.d.ts:4 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* The environment `align mcp` serves. Directories hand out `npx -y @aligndottech/cli mcp`, so onFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Sends the whole process environment outdist/commands/setup.js:1182 · Sends the whole process environment out.addOption(new Option('--env <env>', 'local, preview or prod. Logged in to a team? Setup uses it; --env local builds the local graph instead').hideHelp())Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/xdg.js:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* ignored. It matters beyond correctness: an agent that loads a repo's `.env` (cn, Cline) handsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/xdg.d.ts:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* ignored. It matters beyond correctness: an agent that loads a repo's `.env` (cn, Cline) handsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/lib/mcp-env.js:4 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* The environment `align mcp` serves. Directories hand out `npx -y @aligndottech/cli mcp`, so onFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/lib/share/run.js:181 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// fetch, the confirmation re-post, a later batch): a 502 or a kill after this point cannot orphan aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/token-env.js:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* child's block pins all of them empty (a repo's .env must not choose whose data an agent's server imports), and Align's own backgroundFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈99 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @aligndottech/cli@0.86.0 as of 36 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aligndottech: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Sends the whole process environment out≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim aligndottechPropose a patch to the maintainer