cli@0.86.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Your AI agents know the code. They don't know the company. Local CLI and MCP server that checks your coding agent's change against your team's decisions from Jira, Confluence, Linear, Notion, Slack, Teams, Zoom, GitHub, GitLab, git history and repo docs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ALIGN_LLM_API_KEYALIGN_TOKENALIGN_TOKEN_STOREConfiguration, not credentials: ALIGN_DEBUG, ALIGN_ENV, ALIGN_GATEWAY_URL, ALIGN_INTERNAL, ALIGN_LLM_BASE_URL, ALIGN_LLM_PROVIDER, ALIGN_LLM_TIMEOUT_MS, ALIGN_NO_SYNC, ALIGN_OLLAMA_MODEL, ALIGN_RULES_ACK, ALIGN_TENANT_ID, ALIGN_WRAPPED, COLORFGBG, OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH, OLLAMA_HOST, PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso align.tech, microsoft.com, atlassian.com, slack.com, linear.app, notion.com, git-scm.com, atlassian.net, evil.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names align.tech, microsoft.com, atlassian.com, slack.com, linear.app, notion.com, git-scm.com, atlassian.net, evil.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ALIGN_LLM_API_KEY, ALIGN_TOKEN, ALIGN_TOKEN_STORE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Sends the whole process environment out; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 40 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// `||`, not `??`: OLLAMA_HOST='' (a stock .env template, an unset compose variable)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* The environment `align mcp` serves. Directories hand out `npx -y @aligndottech/cli mcp`, so onFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time..addOption(new Option('--env <env>', 'local, preview or prod. Logged in to a team? Setup uses it; --env local builds the local graph instead').hideHelp())Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.* ignored. It matters beyond correctness: an agent that loads a repo's `.env` (cn, Cline) handsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* ignored. It matters beyond correctness: an agent that loads a repo's `.env` (cn, Cline) handsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* The environment `align mcp` serves. Directories hand out `npx -y @aligndottech/cli mcp`, so onFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// fetch, the confirmation re-post, a later batch): a 502 or a kill after this point cannot orphan aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* child's block pins all of them empty (a repo's .env must not choose whose data an agent's server imports), and Align's own backgroundFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @aligndottech/cli@0.86.0 as of 36 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aligndottech: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Sends the whole process environment out≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.