cli@0.35.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Smithers command-line interface, MCP server, and local workflow tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const PRIVATE_NESTED_NAMES = new Set([".git", ".jj", "node_modules", ".claude", ".codex", ".env"]);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* - no explicit --format / --json flagFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return name.startsWith("smithers.db") || PRIVATE_ROOT_NAMES.has(name) || name.startsWith(".env.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// "exit" hook too) can never double-kill or double-print.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…"Install the curated `smithers` skill into your detected coding agents and, if a CLAUDE.md or AGENTS.md exists, append guidance on when to use smithers.sh workflows. This writes OUTSIDE the project,…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.* exits 0. An external `kill -INT`/`-TERM` misbehaves differently: clack'sFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// only q / Enter / a kill signal can close it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* still executing — so the launcher must NOT kill it. (An earlier versionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* user to reattach to it; commit 871e3d9e9a introduced the kill and theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* exit code that is not one of the interrupt teardown codes, or a hard-kill signalFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* exits 0. An external `kill -INT`/`-TERM` misbehaves differently: clack'sFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* exit code that is not one of the interrupt teardown codes, or a hard-kill signalFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* still executing — so the launcher must NOT kill it. (An earlier versionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if (input.json && !input.pretty) {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* user to reattach to it; commit 871e3d9e9a introduced the kill and theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return PRIVATE_NESTED_NAMES.has(name) || name.startsWith(".env.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @smthrs/cli@0.35.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim smthrs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.