cli@0.3.0-beta.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Sandscape CLI — connect browser and Unreal projects, generate and sync source assets, and install managed game-development skill packs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher sandscape · publishing for 125 daysInstalls 71Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.2.0-beta.8

vet-skills diff cli 0.2.0-beta.8 0.3.0-beta.2

This version reaches for something 0.2.0-beta.8 did not: 2 new hosts (evil.example, sandscape.app). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
evil.example, sandscape.app

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskill-sources/sandscape-assets/SKILL.md:52 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…rent state. `asset save-state <id> --editor <kind> --params-file <complete-state.json>` uses the existing replacement save. It does not render a baked file or publish new source bytes. For an actual rendered PNG/WAV, `asset bake <id> --edi…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/push.js:345 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "upload_failed", outcome.detail ?? "Upload failed.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/init.js:157 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "already_initialized", `Already a Sandscape project: ${srcDir}. Run \`sandscape push\` to upload changes.`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/init.js:291 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "upload_rejected", begun.rejected_reason || "Upload rejected: the import session diverged.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-assets/SKILL.md:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx -y @sandscape/cli@latest …` unless a real `sandscape` is on PATH (they'reFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/init.js:320 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "upload_failed", outcome.detail ?? "Upload failed.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/ignore.js:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `.netrc`, and `credentials.json`. The secret rules are applied BEFORE anyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/generate.js:949 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "usage", `sandscape generate ${kind} needs --in <file> (${INPUT_EXTENSIONS[spec.input].join(", ")}).`, 2);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-cli/SKILL.md:11 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeallowed-tools: Bash(sandscape *), Bash(npx @sandscape/cli *)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/init.js:336 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "commit_rejected", synced.rejected_reason || "Upload rejected: the import session diverged.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/walk.js:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.template",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/ignore.js:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// bundle. Split into exact names, extension globs, and the `.env.*` family.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/generate.js:1354 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// generation.json that the next push uploads; the `done` event carries it.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-cli/SKILL.md:119 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`sandscape …` for brevity; read that as `npx -y @sandscape/cli@latest …` (or aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/commands/skill.js:38 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* install. The other half is the public `skills`-CLI repo (npx skills add …).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/local/file-lock.js:34 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* and taken over, so a holder that never released (crash, kill -9) cannot blockFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/ignore.js:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagskill-sources/sandscape-assets/SKILL.md:48 · Fake instruction boundary tag… ## Edit existing registered images Use `asset edit-image <asset_id> --prompt <instruction> --max-coins <authorized-ceiling> --json` when the output should become a new ve…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-assets/SKILL.md:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeallowed-tools: Bash(sandscape *), Bash(npx @sandscape/cli *)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/publish.js:442 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "banner_upload_failed", `Banner upload failed: ${resp.error || "unknown error"}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/walk.js:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.sample",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/publish.js:485 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Media uploaded. Add --title to publish, or --prepare to stage a draft for review.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-cli/SKILL.md:121 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeSo `sandscape pull` means `npx -y @sandscape/cli@latest pull`. Having this skillFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/auth/token-storage.js:81 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions/* best effort on platforms without chmod */Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/skill.js:126 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("(Optional: `npm i -g @sandscape/cli` to also put `sandscape` on your PATH.)");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/commands/skill.js:129 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log(` npx -y @sandscape/cli@${managed_1.BUNDLE_VERSION} login --json`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/ignore.js:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `.env`(+`.env.*`), `*.pem`/`*.key`/`*.p12`/`*.pfx`, ssh keys, `.npmrc`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/commands/skill.js:125 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log(`on demand via npx — installed from CLI ${managed_1.BUNDLE_VERSION}. No global binary is needed.`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/local/walk.js:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/commands/generate.js:910 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn (0, output_1.commandError)(opts.json, "invalid_arguments", "--asset needs --out <dir> inside the game tree — the default output dir " +Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-cli/SKILL.md:129 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y @sandscape/cli@latest list --json 2>&1 | head -1Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskill-sources/sandscape-cli/SKILL.md:145 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y @sandscape/cli@latest login --json > "$LOG" 2>&1 &Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskill-sources/sandscape-unreal/SKILL.md:12 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…by this project. `sandscape pull` refreshes those sources and `.sandscape/design.json`; `push` uploads only that selection and returns asset review links. Existing project instructi…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdist/local/layout.js:282 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file* Write AGENTS.md as a POSIX symlink to CLAUDE.md, falling back to a smallFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈17,031 tok
4 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @sandscape/cli@0.3.0-beta.2 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sandscape: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sandscapePropose a patch to the maintainer