cli@0.1.12
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "vegastack — a deterministic, offline knowledge harness for coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini) with project-selected local registry entries for infrastructure, cloudops, CI/CD, and Terraform." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Fake instruction boundary tag. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
What would make this Verified
22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vegastack: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unpinned dependencies≈ +3 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
- Unpinned dependency≈ +1 on the totalPin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.