claude-video-digest@1.3.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Lets Claude Code watch videos — screen recordings, share links, any video file — as a timestamped contact sheet and a transcript grouped under the frame each line was spoken over." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
process.stdout.write(`Usage: npx ${PACKAGE.name} [--uninstall]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.<summary>Why not <code>npx skills add</code>?</summary> The [vercel-labs `skills`](https://github.com/vercel-labs/skills) CLI does discover this repo, but it coFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.// npx @anaidenko/claude-video-digest --uninstall remove it and what it left behindFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// npx @anaidenko/claude-video-digest install, or update if installedFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const ffmpeg = process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'brew install ffmpeg' : 'sudo apt install ffmpeg';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// npx @anaidenko/claude-video-digest --helpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.letting a default tool timeout kill it halfway. The frames stay capped at 30, so on a longFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @anaidenko/claude-video-digest@1.3.0 as of 20 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim anaidenko: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.