Skills/npm/claude-telegram-mcp

claude-telegram-mcp@1.0.8

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Telegram integration for Claude Code via MCP (Model Context Protocol)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher s1lverain · publishing for 361 daysInstalls 390Last detonated 7 h ago
$claude mcp add claude-telegram-mcp -- npx -y @s1lverain/claude-telegram-mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso t.me — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @s1lverain/claude-telegram-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 39 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.claude.json
19sprocessdependency install exit 0
39sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · install Install and configure the MCP server test Test the Telegram connection send <message> Send a message to yourself via Telegram help [command] display help for command
39sprocessscript backend runs setup only
39sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
39sfilesystemread ~/.claude.json outside project

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/config/config.js:60 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codethrow new Error(`Config file not found: ${this.configFile}. Please run 'npx @s1lverain/claude-telegram-mcp install' first.`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

No other findings across 1,355 lines in 18 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @s1lverain/claude-telegram-mcp@1.0.8 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.