Skills/npm/claude-content-writer

claude-content-writer@2.4.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Professional content generation system with GSD-style phased workflow, integrated SEO optimization (claude-seo), and anti-AI auditing (humanizer). Features URL-based profile creation with automatic tone detection and comprehensive brand questionnaire. Gen" Observed in sandbox: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher sociilabs · joined 7 days agoInstalls 206Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 1 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.netrc
0.4snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.4snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.4sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git
0.4sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git-remote-https
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/postinstall.js:124 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationscripts/postinstall.js:139 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/adapters/mcp-server/server/test-harness.js:295 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/postinstall.js:161 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/postinstall.js:125 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sociilabs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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