car-image@1.29.2
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Studio-quality images and 3D models of any real car, 1990-2027, by make, model, year or VIN." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- CAR_IMAGE_API_KEY, --api-key — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CAR_IMAGE_API_KEYor--payment-token/--webhook-secretConfiguration, not credentials: CAR_IMAGE_API_URL, CAR_IMAGE_CONFIG, CAR_IMAGE_HOST, CAR_IMAGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK, CAR_IMAGE_NPM_REGISTRY, CAR_IMAGE_TELEMETRY, CONFIG_KEYS, DO_NOT_TRACK, NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER- Where it talks to
- carimage.dev (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CAR_IMAGE_API_KEY and talks to carimage.dev. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.25.0
vet-skills diff car-image 1.25.0 1.29.2In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.25.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 69 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const autoUpdate = ctx.config.autoUpdate ?? DEFAULT_AUTO_UPDATE;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.import { DEFAULT_AUTO_UPDATE, configPath as resolveConfigPath, lastErrorPath, readConfig, updateCachePath, updateConfig, updateLockPath, updateLogPath } from "./config.js";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…e.error ?? `exit ${outcome.code}`}).`, 1, `Run manually: ${target.display} (add sudo only if your global prefix requires it, or switch to a user-writable prefix).`);…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…dateCachePath(env), lockPath: updateLockPath(env), logPath: updateLogPath(env), autoUpdate: config.autoUpdate ?? DEFAULT_AUTO_UPDATE, registry: registryUrl(env) }); re…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const json = format ? format === "json" : /^\s*[[{]/.test(text.replace(/^/, ""));Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.const source = text.replace(/^/, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.summary: "Read or change settings: autoUpdate (always|ask|never), telemetry (on|off), baseUrl; `config path`",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx reuse whatever copy it finds (an old global install included) for asFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const { spawn, plan } = planUpdate({ cache, current: CLI_VERSION, autoUpdate: config.autoUpdate ?? DEFAULT_AUTO_UPDATE, target: detectInstall(), now });Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.usage: "car-image config path\ncar-image config get <autoUpdate|telemetry|baseUrl>\ncar-image config set <autoUpdate|telemetry|baseUrl> <value>\ncar-image config list",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…R_IMAGE_API_KEY=${KEY_PLACEHOLDER} --env CAR_IMAGE_HOST=claude-code${envArg} -- npx -y ${STDIO_PACKAGE_SPEC} mcp`); } const remote = remoteSig…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.import { AUTO_UPDATE_MODES, CONFIG_KEYS, DEFAULT_AUTO_UPDATE, readConfig, storedBaseUrl, updateCachePath, updateConfig } from "../config.js";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw new CliError(`autoUpdate must be one of: ${AUTO_UPDATE_MODES.join(", ")}`, 2);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.cli = `You are running through npx; the next \`npx ${PACKAGE_NAME}@latest\` call uses ${latest}.`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx or project copy, `never`, a directory they cannot write, an install thatFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.io.stdout(`Update available: ${CLI_VERSION} → ${latest}. Run: ${target.method === "npx" ? `npx ${PACKAGE_NAME}@latest` : "car-image update"}\n`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return { spawn: spawnWorker, plan: { action: "notice", latest, message: `${head} \`npx ${PACKAGE_NAME}@latest\` runs it.` } };Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return { method: "npx", display: `npx ${spec}` };Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @meterapp/car-image@1.29.2 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim meterapp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.