brilliant-directories-mcp@6.58.616
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Official MCP server for Brilliant Directories — manage members, posts, leads, reviews, and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- YOUR_KEY, BD_API_KEY, --api-key — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
BD_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BD_API_URL, BD_DEBUG, BD_SITE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso your-site.com, site.com, mysite.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names your-site.com, site.com, mysite.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BD_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 44 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// Future-proof: new Unicode releases that add bidi-control or formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// BD uses to render these values. The spec descriptions say "RGB formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(" Please paste your API key.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…PI key is invalid, revoked, or lacks permission for this endpoint. Verify with: npx brilliant-directories-mcp --verify --api-key KEY --url URL. Server response: ${typeof result.body === "st…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// 14-digit datetime field validator: BD silently truncates wrong-formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…it** - the MCP wrapper forwards unlisted keys verbatim; it does NOT strip them. Do not refuse an edit because a field is absent from the schema. Phrases like "commonly-edite…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.npx brilliant-directories-mcp --setupFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* existing customer configs (npx wizard wrote it, Cursor Directory installsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if (/[\s--]/.test(slug)) {Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.console.log(` claude mcp add ${serverName} -- npx -y brilliant-directories-mcp --api-key ${apiKey} --url ${apiUrl}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for brilliant-directories-mcp@6.58.616 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim brilliantdirectories: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.