brave-search-mcp-server@2.1.5
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Brave Search MCP Server: web results, images, videos, rich results, AI summaries, and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Started with a decoy BRAVE_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.- Tested
- server startup with a tagged decoy in BRAVE_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with a real credential
- Needs
- BRAVE_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYBRAVE_API_KEYBRAVE_API_KEY_FILEor--brave-api-key/--brave-api-key-fileConfiguration, not credentials: BRAVE_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, BRAVE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, BRAVE_MCP_DISABLED_TOOLS, BRAVE_MCP_ENABLED_TOOLS, BRAVE_MCP_HOST, BRAVE_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, BRAVE_MCP_PORT, BRAVE_MCP_STATELESS, BRAVE_MCP_TEST_IMAGE, BRAVE_MCP_TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- brave.com (its own)Also slack.com, a.example, b.example, c.example, allowed.example, evil.example, amazon.com, reuters.com, nytimes.com, bbc.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with a real credential
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names slack.com, a.example, b.example, c.example, allowed.example, evil.example, amazon.com, reuters.com, nytimes.com, bbc.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, BRAVE_API_KEY, BRAVE_API_KEY_FILE only into requests to brave.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.1.4
vet-skills diff brave-search-mcp-server 2.1.4 2.1.5This version reaches for something 2.1.4 did not: 1 new host (amazon.com) · 1 new credential variable (API_KEY) · 4 rewritten tool descriptors (brave_llm_context, brave_local_search, brave_place_search, brave_web_search). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- amazon.com
- New credential variables
- API_KEY
- Rewritten tool descriptors
- brave_llm_context, brave_local_search, brave_place_search, brave_web_search
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 54 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"build": "shx rm -rf dist && tsc && shx chmod +x dist/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.env: { ...process.env, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.