Skills/npm/b2b-domain-contact-enricher-mcp

b2b-domain-contact-enricher-mcp@1.0.10

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "B2B domain contact, email, RFC 9116 security.txt & DNS MX/SPF/DMARC deliverability enricher MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher revclamp · publishing for 19 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 11 h ago
$claude mcp add b2b-domain-contact-enricher-mcp -- npx -y @revclamp/b2b-domain-contact-enricher-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
revclamp.com (its own)Also stripe.com, apify.com, cloudflare-dns.com, dns.google, linkedin.com, x.com, linear.app, cloudflare.com, hackerone.com, shopify.com, datadoghq.com, vercel.com, supabase.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable and talks to revclamp.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @revclamp/b2b-domain-contact-enricher-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · "effectiveMarginMultiplier": 0, "marginPositive": false } }
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/web_preview_server.mjs:74 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files<p class="brand-subtitle">Deterministic B2B Role Contacts, RFC 9116 Security.txt Signals, Schema.org ContactPoint &amp; DNS-over-HTTPS MX/SPF/DMARC Deliverability Posture</p>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionassets/playground.js:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileshint: 'Domain or HTTPS URL to inspect for RFC 9116 security.txt directives and root-domain MX/SPF/DMARC DNS posture.',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_server.mjs:192 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files'Performs a focused RFC 9116 /.well-known/security.txt compliance audit and DNS-over-HTTPS MX, SPF (v=spf1), and DMARC (_dmarc) deliverability posture inspection for a single B2B domain.',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/apify_actor.mjs:267 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfor (const candidateName of [`${inputKey}.json`, inputKey]) {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/web_preview_server.mjs:91 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files<option value="resolve_b2b_domain_contacts">Resolve B2B Domain Contacts, Security.txt &amp; DNS Posture</option>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionassets/playground.js:41 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filestitle: 'Resolve B2B Domain Contacts, Security.txt & DNS Posture',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/web_preview_server.mjs:92 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files<option value="inspect_domain_dns_and_security_txt">Inspect Domain RFC 9116 Security.txt &amp; DNS Posture</option>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.actor/output_schema.json:4 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"description": "Enriched B2B domain contact profiles, RFC 9116 security.txt metadata, and DNS MX/SPF/DMARC posture (Default Dataset) plus execution/billing telemetry (Key-Value Store OUTPUT).",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/apify_actor.mjs:958 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesoptions?.platformHooks || createApifyPlatformHooks(options?.env || process.env, options?.fetchImpl);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.actor/input_schema.json:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…escription": "Extract verified B2B role contacts, RFC 9116 /.well-known/security.txt disclosures, Schema.org ContactPoint JSON-LD, de-obfuscated emails, social links, and DNS-over-HTTPS MX/SPF/DMARC deliverability posture across B2B domain…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionassets/playground.js:78 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filestitle: 'Inspect Domain RFC 9116 Security.txt & DNS Posture',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈104 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @revclamp/b2b-domain-contact-enricher-mcp@1.0.10 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.