axf@2.1.4
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Agent eXoskeleton Framework control plane for workspace-native agent capabilities over MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
## Internal ruleFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.// Build a minimal argsSchema from an args descriptor. The family formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.env: { ...env, ...server.rootEnvironment },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env: ctx.runtime?.env ?? process.env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.import { readFile, writeFile, rename, stat, chmod } from "node:fs/promises";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.published terms. Outside a fitted workspace, with no root override, this exampleFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @smartergpt/axf@2.1.4 as of 1 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.