Skills/npm/autocodeflow-mcp-server

autocodeflow-mcp-server@2.2.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for AutoCodeFlow — lets AI agents (Claude, Cursor, etc.) manage tasks and executions" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher luludeer · publishing for 71 daysInstalls 1,693Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add autocodeflow-mcp-server -- npx -y autocodeflow-mcp-server
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Coverage

Started with a decoy AUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKEN; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.
Tested
server startup with a tagged decoy in AUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKEN · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with a real credential
Needs
AUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTOCODEFLOW_API_REFRESH_TOKENAUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: AUTOCODEFLOW_API_URL, VITEST
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with a real credential

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AUTOCODEFLOW_API_REFRESH_TOKEN, AUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y autocodeflow-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 55 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
14sprocessdependency install exit 0
34sprocessrelaunched with a decoy AUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKEN (tagged; nothing real)
54sclaimed56 tools with a decoy AUTOCODEFLOW_API_TOKEN: list_tasks, get_task, trigger_task, update_task, list_task_versions, rollback_task_version, compare_task_versions, list_executions, get_execution, analyze_execution, get_execution_stats, suggest_schedule, get_execution_logs, kill_execution, retry_execution, pause_task, resume_task, export_task, import_task, list_task_templates, create_task_from_template, list_applications, get_application, create_application, update_application
54sprocessscript backend runs setup only
54sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/tools/task-update.js:62 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…TION .nullable() .optional() .describe('Timeout action: kill (default — executor kills the process tree) | kill_retry (kill + re-enqueue once…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

No other findings across 4,071 lines in 40 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈65 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈14,491 tok
56 tools · 259 per tool
Handshake
1125 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 240

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for autocodeflow-mcp-server@2.2.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.