Skills/npm/attio-mcp

attio-mcp@1.7.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "AI-powered access to Attio CRM. Manage contacts, companies, deals, tasks, and notes. Search records, update pipelines, and automate workflows for sales and GTM teams." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher kesslerio · publishing for 526 daysInstalls 9,326Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ATTIO_ACCESS_TOKENATTIO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ATTIO_API_BASE_URL, ATTIO_BASE_URL, ATTIO_MCP_TOOL_MODE, ATTIO_PHONE_METADATA, ATTIO_WORKSPACE_ID, COUNT_MODEL_DEFAULT, E2E_MODE, LOG_FORMAT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_SERVER_MODE, OFFLINE_MODE, TASKS_DEBUG, USE_MOCK_DATA, VERBOSE_TESTS, VITEST
Where it talks to
attio.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ATTIO_ACCESS_TOKEN, ATTIO_API_KEY and talks to attio.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets ATTIO_ACCESS_TOKEN=attio.com,ATTIO_API_KEY=attio.com -- npx -y attio-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 16 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
15sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-1x7KRq/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-21T04_43_18_937Z-debug-0.log
15sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli/discover.js:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:385 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><strong>Building from Source</strong></summary> For development or custom deployments: ```bash git clone https://github.com/kesslerio/attio-mcp-server.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:18 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file**🎉 v1.0.0 Milestone**: Complete Attio CRM surface coverage with full ChatGPT Developer Mode integration.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:22 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file## 🚀 **ChatGPT Developer Mode Integration**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:129 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:e2e": "node --env-file=.env test/e2e/run-e2e-tests.js",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:94 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"test-hooks": "chmod +x build/test-hooks.sh && ./build/test-hooks.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:31 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **📖 Setup Guide**: See [ChatGPT Developer Mode docs](./docs/chatgpt-developer-mode.md) and [Cloudflare Worker Guide](./examples/cloudflare-mcp-server/README.md)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:28 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"postbuild": "shx chmod +x dist/*.js && shx mkdir -p dist/templates && shx cp -r src/templates/* dist/templates/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:18 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file**🎉 v1.0.0 Milestone**: Complete Attio CRM surface coverage with full ChatGPT Developer Mode integration.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:133 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:e2e:tools": "node --env-file=.env ./node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs run --config configs/vitest/vitest.config.e2e.ts test/e2e/tools/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/utils/date-utils.js:284 · Destructive file system command detected// Accept both full ISO format and date-only formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:31 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **📖 Setup Guide**: See [ChatGPT Developer Mode docs](./docs/chatgpt-developer-mode.md) and [Cloudflare Worker Guide](./examples/cloudflare-mcp-server/README.md)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:22 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file## 🚀 **ChatGPT Developer Mode Integration**Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:e2e:limited": "node --env-file=.env test/e2e/run-e2e-tests.js --limited",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Environment variables will need to be set manually if .env loading failsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:130 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:e2e:check": "node --env-file=.env test/e2e/run-e2e-tests.js --check",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:95 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"docker:build": "chmod +x scripts/docker-build.sh && ./scripts/docker-build.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:211 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Developer Mode Ready**: Every tool now publishes MCP safety annotations (`readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`) so OpenAI Developer Mode can auto-approve reads and request confirmation for writes.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:211 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **Developer Mode Ready**: Every tool now publishes MCP safety annotations (`readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`) so OpenAI Developer Mode can auto-approve reads and request confirmation for writes.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:92 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"setup:minimal": "chmod +x scripts/setup-dev-env.sh && ./scripts/setup-dev-env.sh --skip-tdd --skip-ide --skip-hooks",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:132 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:e2e:help": "node --env-file=.env test/e2e/run-e2e-tests.js --help",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:91 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"setup": "chmod +x scripts/setup-dev-env.sh && ./scripts/setup-dev-env.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈76 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for attio-mcp@1.7.0 as of 47 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kesslerio: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kesslerioPropose a patch to the maintainer