anything-to-journal@1.2.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Build auditable journal manuscripts and edit them in a local PDF/LaTeX workspace" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 45/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyt+CategoryObserved action
This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/anything-to-journal.mjs:199 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/anything-to-journal.mjs:200 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/anything-to-journal.mjs:31 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressskills/anything-to-journal/SKILL.md:169 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/anything-to-journal/SKILL.md:202 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedskills/anything-to-journal/assets/workspace/pdfjs/pdf.mjs:25 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressskills/anything-to-journal/SKILL.md:147 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/workspace_editor.py:898 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/anything-to-journal.mjs:30 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressskills/anything-to-journal/SKILL.md:169 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Base64 encoding combined with network callskills/anything-to-journal/assets/workspace/pdfjs/pdf.mjs:25 · Base64 encoding combined with network call — potential data exfiltrationFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressskills/anything-to-journal/SKILL.md:147 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/anything-to-journal/assets/workspace/pdfjs/pdf.mjs:25 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/audit.py:288 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/workspace_editor.py:898 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/prepare.py:472 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/build.py:61 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/doctor.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/anything-to-journal/scripts/audit.py:945 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07What would make this Verified
35 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim howardtuan: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Base64 encoding combined with network call≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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