alterlab-mcp-server@1.13.31
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "MCP server for web scraping, structured data extraction, and screenshots — give Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, and AI agents the ability to scrape any website with automatic anti-bot bypass" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Started with a decoy ALTERLAB_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.- Tested
- server startup with a tagged decoy in ALTERLAB_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with a real credential
- Needs
- ALTERLAB_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ALTERLAB_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALTERLAB_API_URL- Where it talks to
- alterlab.io (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with a real credential
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ALTERLAB_API_KEY and talks to alterlab.io. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.13.30
vet-skills diff alterlab-mcp-server 1.13.30 1.13.31In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.13.30 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 47 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
… grant started; an agent cannot lift a pause the user set, and takeover and the kill switch are available only from the user's own dashboard session.", "…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." Paste your API key: ",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.h":2000,"description":"Natural language instructions for LLM extraction (e.g., 'Extract all product prices and ratings')Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct." npx -y alterlab-mcp-server",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for alterlab-mcp-server@1.13.31 as of 35 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.