agentic-sdlc-skill@1.55.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Documentation-First SDLC protocol for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Google Antigravity and Codex with risk triage, Vision governance, installed support files and optional devPNT integration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Hidden zero-width characters detected; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
generated by scripts/whats_new.js from CHANGELOG.md: edit the CHANGELOG, then run node scripts/whats_new.js --writeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.s = s.replace(/[--]/g, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.[gate] The promises that outrank everything: what the user is guaranteed, what the architecture must always be true of. State each as ONE decision question withFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Interview question 1: ONE concrete case that today does not get the expected result, with its example — never a missing feature. Cite the answer (REQUEST_[unit]Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(top), *args], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(Path(__file__).resolve()), "index",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.const CODEX_HOOK_WRAPPER = "import base64,json,subprocess,sys;d=json.loads(base64.b64decode(sys.argv[2]));subprocess.run([sys.executable,d['validator'],*d['argv']],input=sys.stdin.buffer.read())";Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["git", "diff", "--name-only", ref, "--", rel_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["git", "check-ignore", "-q", str(out)], cwd=str(project),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["git", "status", "--porcelain", "--", rel],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.INVISIBLE = re.compile("[--]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.console.log('👉 npx agentic-sdlc-init');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# router: a router throw must not kill this line. It measures NOTESFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r2 = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "--others", "--exclude-standard", "--", rel_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @antoneeo/agentic-sdlc-skill@1.55.0 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim antoneeo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.