agentic-flow@3.4.4
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "The agentic meta-harness — freeze the model, evolve the harness. An open runtime that routes each query to the cost-optimal model, evolves its own harness (planner/context/reviewer/retry/tool/memory/score policy) and autonomously repairs code, then orches" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYE2B_API_KEYGOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEYOLLAMA_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYPROXY_API_KEYSREQUESTY_API_KEYor--max-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT, AGENTDB_PATH, AGENTIC_FLOW_AGENT_BOOSTER, AGENTIC_FLOW_BOOSTER_THRESHOLD, AGENTIC_FLOW_ENABLE_QUIC, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, ANTHROPIC_PROXY_BASE_URL, COMPLETION_MODEL, DATASET, DIFF, ENABLE_STREAMING, HEALTH_PORT, KEEP_ALIVE, MODEL, OLLAMA_BASE_URL, OLLAMA_HOST, OLLAMA_MODEL, ONNX_EXECUTION_PROVIDERS, ONNX_MODEL_PATH, ONNX_OPTIMIZED, ONNX_PROXY_PORT, OPENROUTER_BASE_URL, PROVIDER, PROXY_PORT, QUIC_CERT_PATH, QUIC_HOST, QUIC_KEY_PATH, QUIC_MAX_CONNECTIONS, QUIC_MAX_STREAMS, QUIC_PORT, QUIC_SERVER_HOST, QUIC_SERVER_PORT, QUIC_VERIFY_PEER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, ruv.io, e2b.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, ruv.io, e2b.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, E2B_API_KEY, GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY, OLLAMA_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, PROXY_API_KEYS, REQUESTY_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 17 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
/\|\|\s*rm\s+-rf/i, // OR chained destructive rmFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(` docker run --env-file .env claude-agents --agent <name> --task "Your task"\n`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.error('Set it in .env or export GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY=xxxxx');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./;\s*rm\s/i, // Command chaining with rmFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Must stay the first import: loads cwd/.env (or --env-file <path>), never aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Side-effect import: load cwd/.env (or --env-file <path>) before any otherFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./&&\s*rm\s+-rf/i, // Chained destructive rmFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.error('Set it in .env or export REQUESTY_API_KEY=sk-xxxxx');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// parent directory, and never endpoint overrides from an implicit .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.error('Set it in .env or export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-xxxxx');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(read from the environment and ./.env only; *_BASE_URL and *_PROXY_* keysFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.are ignored in ./.env unless the file is passed with --env-file <path>)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// npx (parent directory)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow reasoningbank demo Run interactive demo comparisonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* Safe execution of npx commandsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow proxy --provider gemini --port 3000Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* - npx agentic-flow mcp add weather --npm weather-mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* - npx agentic-flow mcp listFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* console.log(result); // Output: 4Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.npx agentic-flow [COMMAND] [OPTIONS]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* - npx agentic-flow mcp remove weatherFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow proxy [OPTIONS]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow reasoningbank benchmark Run performance benchmarksFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow quic [OPTIONS]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow reasoningbank init Initialize databaseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log('\n💡 Use it with: npx agentic-flow --agent coder --task "your task"');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// process entry point (e.g. `node dist/index.js` or `npx agentic-flow`).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.echo " docker run --env-file .env claude-agents:cli --agent goal-planner --task \"Plan feature\""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Usage: npx agentic-flow-proxy --agent coder --task "Create code" --openrouterFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log(result.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* console.log(result); // Output: 4Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(result.output || 'Edit applied');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(result.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* Usage: npx agentic-flow-proxy --agent coder --task "Create code" --openrouterFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Use npx with --yes to auto-confirmFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow proxy --provider openrouter --model "openai/gpt-4o-mini"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* - npx agentic-flow mcp add local --local /path/to/server.jsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* - This runs after npm install, npm install -g, and npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx agentic-flow reasoningbank test Run validation testsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log('[agentic-flow] This is OK for npx - runtime patch will handle it');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.-e, --error <context> Error context for debuggingFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log('[agentic-flow] ⚠️ Postinstall had issues:', error.message);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log('[agentic-flow] ✅ Postinstall complete');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.npx [email protected] workers dispatch "<prompt>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for agentic-flow@3.4.4 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ruvnet: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.