Skills/npm/agent-store-cli

agent-store-cli@0.1.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Agent Store deployment CLI for local coding agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher guanxintec · publishing for 118 daysInstalls 257Last detonated 22 min ago
$claude mcp add agent-store-cli -- npx -y @guanxintec/agent-store-cli
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.0

vet-skills diff agent-store-cli 0.1.0 0.1.1

This version reaches for something 0.1.0 did not: 1 new host (guanxintec.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
guanxintec.com

0.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:592 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (name === '.env' || name.startsWith('.env.'))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:526 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (flags.json || !input.isTTY) {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:410 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (flags.json || flags.yes || !input.isTTY) {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/agent-store-cli/SKILL.md:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Never read or print `.env` secrets unless the user explicitly asks and it is necessary.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:447 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (flags.json || flags.yes || !input.isTTY)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,128 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.