Skills/npm/agent-mcp-pool

agent-mcp-pool@4.0.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "A pool of long-lived Model Context Protocol clients, exposing every connected server's tools to an OpenAI-compatible agent loop as `<slug>__<tool>`." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher cubicecho · publishing for 76 daysInstalls 2,932Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add agent-mcp-pool -- npx -y @cubicecho/agent-mcp-pool
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/servers.js:168 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn host.process?.env ?? {};Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/transport.js:117 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/types.d.ts:453 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* What an operator reaches for to find a wedged child in `ps` or to `kill -9` it, and notFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagREADME.md:294 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction filedefault) and the total at 2000. Each block is `<hook_context source="…">`, not `<context>`, whichFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/types.d.ts:328 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport type McpServerConfig = StdioServerConfig | HttpServerConfig;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈67 tok
1 file · 57 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @cubicecho/agent-mcp-pool@4.0.1 as of 39 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.