Skills/npm/agent-hooks

agent-hooks@1.9.239

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Human-in-the-loop (HITL) for AI agents: ask a person for approvals or answers by push notification. One command connects Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher pushary · publishing for 198 daysInstalls 29,445Last detonated 16 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PUSHARY_API_KEY or --no-ask-password / --with-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: ANSWER_PATH_SUFFIX, APPROVALS_PATH, BUILD_TAG, CLAIM_PATH, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, CLI_LOCAL_BIND_PATH, CODEX_EVENT_KEY, CODEX_HOME, DEVICE_KEY_PATH, EXECUTOR_NUMBER, GEMINI_CLI_HOME, HERMES_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST_KEY, HERMES_GATE_TOOLS_KEY, HERMES_HOME, IDENTITY_PATH, JENKINS_HOME, MACHINES_PATH, OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR, PATHEXT, ProgramFiles, ProgramW6432, PUSHARY_AGENT_NAME, PUSHARY_API_URL, PUSHARY_APP_REGISTER_TIMEOUT_MS, PUSHARY_AUTO_DECISION_BEACON, PUSHARY_AUTO_NOTIFY_SESSION_END, PUSHARY_BASE_URL, PUSHARY_CLAUDE_BIN, PUSHARY_COMMAND_DIR, PUSHARY_CONFIG_FILE, PUSHARY_DEFER_BYPASS, PUSHARY_GATE_TIMEOUT_MS, PUSHARY_LEDGER_FILE, PUSHARY_MCP_PATH_PREFIX, PUSHARY_MODEL_PRICING, PUSHARY_RECEIPTS, PUSHARY_RECIPIENT_PIN_FILE, PUSHARY_RESPECT_PERMISSION_MODE, PUSHARY_SESSION_KEY_DIR
Where it talks to
pushary.com (its own)Also nodejs.org, apple.com, microsoft.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nodejs.org, apple.com, microsoft.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PUSHARY_API_KEY only into requests to pushary.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets PUSHARY_API_KEY=pushary.com -- npx -y @pushary/agent-hooks

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.9.219

vet-skills diff agent-hooks 1.9.219 1.9.239

This version reaches for something 1.9.219 did not: 2 new hosts (apple.com, microsoft.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
apple.com, microsoft.com

1.9.219 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 2 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
2.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 · npm error code EUNSUPPORTEDPROTOCOL npm error Unsupported URL Type "workspace:": workspace:* npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-5Ig8I3/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-22T20_37_28_185Z-debug-0.log
2.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
2.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
2.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-OM4WDT5Q.js:1673 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"\`npx -y pushary@latest setup\` with the key Hermes uses, or Session history turned on in the Pushary Mac app")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/chunk-D5IDQEUV.js:816 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…ray(value)) return false; const snapshot = value; return typeof snapshot.hadMcpServers === "boolean" && typeof snapshot.mcpServersWasRecord === "boolean" && (!snapshot.hadMcpServers || snapshot.mcpServersWasRecord || Object.hasOwn(snapshot…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/chunk-AIZYJJGD.js:76 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegestext: `Phone-start ${STOPS_AT_LOGOUT}. To keep it running: \`sudo loginctl enable-linger ${outcome.user}\``Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-D5IDQEUV.js:1247 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvar ENVIRONMENT_FILE_NAME = ".env";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-BCFJAUVD.js:2403 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif (mode?.kill || mode?.mode === "terminal_only") return;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-ARDB6TVA.js:879 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` ${dim('This computer keeps its own key. Revoke the extra "Paired agent (mobile)" key at')} ${cyan("pushary.com/dashboard/agent/settings")}${dim(".")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-D5IDQEUV.js:1301 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateState = () => join7(pusharyDir(), "auto-update.json");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-PB2J2OH6.js:96 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateDecision = (input) => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-PB2J2OH6.js:98 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeconst offReason = autoUpdateOffReason(input);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-BCFJAUVD.js:2361 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif (mode?.kill || mode?.mode === "terminal_only") return;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-OM4WDT5Q.js:2659 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…ugins/pushary` and selects Pushary as the approval transport. On any computer, `npx -y pushary@latest setup --agents hermes` does the same. The plugin can also come f…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-PB2J2OH6.js:105 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateReportState = (decision) => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddist/chunk-OM4WDT5Q.js:1944 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([*helper, "authorize-export"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/chunk-AIZYJJGD.js:83 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreturn `no: it ${STOPS_AT_LOGOUT}; run \`pushary daemon install\`, or \`sudo loginctl enable-linger $USER\``;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-BCFJAUVD.js:1996 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// `npx ... doctor` reports npx for that invocation and claude_plugin asFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-PB2J2OH6.js:60 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateOffReason = (input) => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-BCFJAUVD.js:710 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesreturn { ...unknownMode(), kill: last.state.kill === true };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/chunk-OM4WDT5Q.js:2659 · Destructive file system command detected…n**Example - dangerous command approval:**\n\n```json\n{\n "question": "Allow: rm -rf /tmp/build-artifacts/*",\n "type": "confirm",\n "context": "Cleaning up 2.3GB o…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-ARDB6TVA.js:301 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` ${dim("A browser on this computer is subscribed, but no phone is connected yet.")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddist/chunk-OM4WDT5Q.js:2101 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command, input=json.dumps(payload), text=True, env=_registration_environment(key),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-PB2J2OH6.js:102 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeif (checkedWithinInterval(input.state.lastCheckAt, input.now, autoUpdateCheckInterval(input.state))) return { kind: "skip", reason: "checked_recently" };Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈81 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pushary: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim pusharyPropose a patch to the maintainer