aftermath@0.7.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Post-failure recovery skill for AI coding agents: stop, revert cheap damage, return to last-known-good. Project-aware destructive guards, forward-edit freeze, checkpoints, and host parity for OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex." Observed in sandbox: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 19 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.5.3
vet-skills diff aftermath 0.5.3 0.7.0This version reaches for something 0.5.3 did not: 1 new install script (node scripts/postinstall.js). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New install scripts
- node scripts/postinstall.js
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 4 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
npx @after.math/aftermath init $ARGUMENTS --jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const ALWAYS_PROTECTED = ['.git', '.env*', 'secrets*', '*.pem', '*.key'];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.npx @after.math/aftermath init $ARGUMENTS --jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/moah0911/aftermath/main/scripts/install.sh \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.| Mocha | `1 failing` | `npx mocha tests/auth.spec.js --grep login` |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time./\brm\s+[^|&;]*-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*f/i, // rm -rf / rm -RfFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary>Checkout / manual, curl bootstrapper, skills-only</summary> **Checkout / manual:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/moah0911/aftermath node aftermaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.| Jest / Vitest | `✕`, `1 failed`, `FAIL` | `npx jest auth.spec -t "login"` |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out./\brm\s+[^|&;]*-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*r/i, // rm -frFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./\brm\s+[^|&;]*-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*f/i, // rm -rf / rm -RfFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/moah0911/aftermath/main/scripts/install.sh \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.| Permissions | `chmod -R 777` | Narrow the mode and the path |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts./\brm\s+-[a-zA-Z]*r\b/i, // rm -rFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @after.math/aftermath@0.7.0 as of 13 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/opencode/opencode.json, ~/.config/aftermath/repo/.git/config, ~/.config/aftermath/repo/.git/packed-refs.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim after.math: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.