Skills/npm/adt-mcp

adt-mcp@0.4.59

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for SAP ADT operations – exposes adt-cli features as MCP tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher abapify · publishing for 212 daysInstalls 7,206Last detonated 5 h ago
$claude mcp add adt-mcp -- npx -y @abapify/adt-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTH_TOKENOAUTH_AUDIENCEOAUTH_ISSUEROAUTH_JWKS_URIOAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPESOAUTH_USER_CLAIMTRUST_FORWARDED_AUTH or --auth-token / --trust-forwarded-auth / --oauth-issuer / --oauth-audience / --oauth-jwks-uri / --oauth-required-scope / --oauth-user-claimConfiguration, not credentials: ADT_CONFIG_FILE, MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_CORS_ORIGIN, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TLS_CERT, MCP_TLS_KEY, SAP_SYSTEMS_FILE, SAP_SYSTEMS_JSON
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso sap.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sap.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, OAUTH_AUDIENCE, OAUTH_ISSUER, OAUTH_JWKS_URI, OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES, OAUTH_USER_CLAIM, TRUST_FORWARDED_AUTH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @abapify/adt-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 8 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.5sprocessdependency install exit 1 · npm error 404 Note that you can also install from a npm error 404 tarball, folder, http url, or git url. npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-J3s43h/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-19T00_36_51_285Z-debug-0.log
7.5sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
7.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
7.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/server-BiW3huup.mjs:235 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialstext: "sap_connect requires HTTP transport (Mcp-Session-Id). Stdio callers should pass credentials per tool call instead."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/server-BFgvMT_g.mjs:113 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsif (entry.username || entry.password) process.stderr.write(`[multi-system] warning: system '${id}' contains credentials in config; dropping them. Pass credentials via sap_connect at runtime.\n`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/server-BFgvMT_g.mjs:1050 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network* → spin up a new McpServer + StreamableHTTPServerTransport pair,Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.mjs:162 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…nationContextRegistry, createHttpMcpHandler, createMcpInvocationVerifier, createMcpServer, createSessionRegistry, isMcpToolAllowed, loadMultiSystemConfig, operationClassForMcpTool, parseDelegatedAssistantReadPolicy, parseSafeExecutePolicy,…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/bin/adt-mcp.mjs:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* Start with: npx adt-mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @abapify/adt-mcp@0.4.59 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.