zeqqat@0.3.2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Open source MCP gateway. Your agent connects to one Zeqqat URL instead of holding your API keys; Zeqqat enforces per-connection permissions, keeps secrets out of the model (handles, not values) and logs every call. Works with Dokploy today and any API from its OpenAPI spec." Observed in sandbox: calls registry.npmjs.org only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
BETTER_AUTH_SECRETDATABASE_URLENABLED_AUTH_PROVIDERSGITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETGOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRETPOSTGRES_PASSWORDRESEND_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DO_NOT_TRACK, GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, MAIL_FROM, NEXT_RUNTIME, SEGMENT_PATTERN, SMTP_URL, UMAMI_SCRIPT_URL, ZEQQAT_EDITION, ZEQQAT_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ZEQQAT_OPERATOR_KEY, ZEQQAT_PUBLIC_URL, ZEQQAT_TELEMETRY, ZEQQAT_TELEMETRY_URL- Where it talks to
- zeqqat.com (its own)Also claude.ai, resend.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · reached only registry.npmjs.org
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, resend.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, DATABASE_URL, ENABLED_AUTH_PROVIDERS, GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET, GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET, POSTGRES_PASSWORD, RESEND_API_KEY only into requests to zeqqat.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: calls registry.npmjs.org only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 3 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- pnpm — this repo enforces it (`preinstall: npx only-allow pnpm`)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log("[zeqqat] sending an anonymous daily install ping (id and version only). Set ZEQQAT_TELEMETRY=0 to turn it off.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# cp .env.example .env # fill in the valuesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// KEY=VALUE, as it appears in an env block or a .env file dump.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."preinstall": "npx only-allow pnpm",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.