Skills/Glama/yt

yt@r1

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents and humans to fetch YouTube transcripts, search within them, inspect video metadata, and monitor channel uploads through bounded, resumable MCP tools." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Registry GlamaPublisher arasandev · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Blocked here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Revoked: guards refuse to launch this version

confirmed incident: contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared) Every machine running vet-skills guard stops starting it at the next launch; the state clears when the honeypot re-run or a reviewer clears it.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso youtube.com, yahoo.com, youtu.be, githubusercontent.com, example.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared)
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Do not connect it. The honeypot or a critical finding blocked this version; the evidence is below.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is yt@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 47/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 2 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
1.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
1.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
1.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
1.0sprocessexited 1: yt install: download failed: https://github.com/ArasanDev/yt/releases/download/v0.1.1/yt_0.1.1_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz
1.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
1.7snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
1.7snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
1.7snetworkCONNECT tcp://release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
1.7sprocessexited 1: yt install: download failed: https://github.com/ArasanDev/yt/releases/download/v0.1.1/yt_0.1.1_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz

Static findings

HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:25 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:132 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 0755 "$STAGED"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:4 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL.goreleaser.yaml:104 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceInstall with `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | sh`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:25 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell pattern.goreleaser.yaml:104 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeInstall with `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:4 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:4 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:25 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.goreleaser.yaml:104 · Remote installer piped to shellInstall with `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ArasanDev/yt/main/install.sh | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,065 tok
2 files · 52 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

33 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim arasandev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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