Skills/Glama/yahoo-finance-mcp

yahoo-finance-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients such as Claude, ChatGPT, and Notion to retrieve Yahoo Finance quotes, price history, fundamentals, analyst and holder data, options, funds, screeners, market summaries, calendars, and live ticks through 24 tools. It supports remote Streamable HTTP access with OAuth 2.1, Basic auth, and client credentials." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher okikusan-public · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add yahoo-finance-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH_CLIENT_IDOAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETOAUTH_REDIRECT_URISOAUTH_SIGNING_KEY or --set-secrets / --allow-unauthenticatedConfiguration, not credentials: PUBLIC_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.ai, claude.com, notion.com, chatgpt.com, run.app, yahoo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, claude.com, notion.com, chatgpt.com, run.app, yahoo.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, OAUTH_REDIRECT_URIS, OAUTH_SIGNING_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .env # then set OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET (openssl rand -hex 32)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a; . ./.env; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…project IDs or numbers, real service URLs). Real values live only in the local `.env`, which is gitignored along with `.dockerignore`/`.gcloudignore` exclusions. - …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)auth.py:243 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""Register the OAuth endpoints as MCPServer custom routes. The config is created at startup, so it is passed as a getter."""Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_http_auth.py:299 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "auth.py", "issue-token", "--days", "1", "--base-url", live_server],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:193 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileAdd a custom connector (Settings → Connectors, developer mode) with:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:193 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileAdd a custom connector (Settings → Connectors, developer mode) with:Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,445 tok
7 files · 37 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.