woodpresser@0.1.3
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Gives AI coding agents typed, mode-gated access to a real WordPress site — content, media, users and settings via core REST, plus PHP execution, SQL queries, filesystem operations and Elementor page read/build/patch/snapshot via a companion bridge plugin. Destructive actions and code execution are guarded by feature flags, explicit confirm literals, dry runs, redaction and audit logging." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WOODPRESSER_APP_PASSWORDWOODPRESSER_BRIDGE_TOKENWP_APP_PASSWORDWP_BRIDGE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: npm_execpath, WOODPRESSER_BRIDGE_FILE, WOODPRESSER_CONFIG, WOODPRESSER_MODES, WOODPRESSER_SITE, WOODPRESSER_SITE_URL, WOODPRESSER_TIMEOUT_MS, WOODPRESSER_USER, WP_URL, WP_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nodejs.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects WOODPRESSER_APP_PASSWORD, WOODPRESSER_BRIDGE_TOKEN, WP_APP_PASSWORD, WP_BRIDGE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 3 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* WOODPRESSER_PLAYGROUND_CLI, ../../Desktop/wordpresser/node_modules/.bin, npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* Close the listener and kill keep-alive sockets.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.