Skills/Glama/waystation

waystation@0.2.10

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI sessions across machines and terminals on a local network to message one another, share records, and distribute parallel tasks to workers without cloud services or accounts." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher createunion · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 7d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/collab/service.js:1648 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesstate.log.warn('已接受邀请取数失败(按无记录处置)', { collabId: input?.collabId, reason: error?.message });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/viewer/launch.js:3 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* 全部副作用经参数注入(fetch / spawn / kill / sleep / exists / readFile / startServer),组合根Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/core/changeover.js:314 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* 首次 observe 即进 hard-kill 阶段。Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/viewer/launch.js:24 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/* --stop 在 kill 后等待端口释放的上限(计划 §3):超时即释放复验失败,如实上报而非默认成功。 */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/ws-viewer.js:27 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/* 用户可见故障统一退出码 2(用法错误、端口不可得、kill 失败——设计 §4.1/§4.2)。 */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/viewer/launch.js:221 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* 命中;同根实例不多于候选端口数,轮数上限取候选数(防「kill 后同根立刻再现」类异常下死循环)。Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/collab/injected.js:100 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesstate.log.warn('注入标记写入失败(内存态继续)', { collabId: state.collabId, authorId, postId, reason: error.message });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/core-cli.js:384 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = killGuarded ?? (await loadSharedKillGuarded());Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/viewer/launch.js:26 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/* 释放轮询周期:kill 到端口真正释放通常只需几毫秒,100ms 粒度在 3s 窗口内留 30 次机会,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/net/protocol.js:498 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content* ZWJ 组合序列(U+200D∈Cf,如 👨‍👩‍👧)按 Cf 拒绝。Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/viewer/launch.js:142 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/* kill 后轮询至端口释放(探测返回 null):窗口内未释放=false——「发过 kill」不等于「已停止」,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/viewer/text.js:3 · Destructive file system command detected* 控制类(C0 / DEL / C1,含可作终端 CSI 的 U+009B)与格式类(Cf——双向文本重排、零宽类,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/collab/service.js:1629 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesstate.log.warn('挂起邀请取数失败(按无记录处置)', { collabId: input?.collabId, reason: error?.message });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/collab/injected.js:81 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesstate.log.warn('注入标记形态不符(拒绝入集)', { collabId: state.collabId, authorId, postId });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈36 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim createunion: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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