Skills/Glama/watchmyrun

watchmyrun@1.3.5

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Real-time marathon & road/trail race runner position forecasting, spectator cheer spot arrival windows, on-course sighting pin pace recalibration, and worldwide GPX/FIT/OpenStreetMap course search." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher web-gears · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 25 h ago
$npx skills add watchmyrun
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
NEXT_PUBLIC_CARTO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BASE_WEB_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso watchmy.run, ridewithgps.com, workers.dev, waymarkedtrails.org, run-weather.com, ko-fi.com, openstreetmap.org, duckduckgo.com, topografix.com, chatgpt.com, carto.com, rungoapp.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names watchmy.run, ridewithgps.com, workers.dev, waymarkedtrails.org, run-weather.com, ko-fi.com, openstreetmap.org, duckduckgo.com, topografix.com, chatgpt.com, carto.com, rungoapp.com, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NEXT_PUBLIC_CARTO_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mcp-worker/src/server.ts:44 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport function createWatchMyRunMcpServer(baseUrl = 'https://watchmy.run'): McpServer {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

No other findings across 19,031 lines in 81 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.