wallabag@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to read and manage entries, tags, annotations, search, configuration, and account information on a self-hosted read-later service, with write operations requiring explicit confirmation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WALLABAG_ACCESS_TOKENWALLABAG_CLIENT_SECRETWALLABAG_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: LIVE_DEBUG, WALLABAG_ALLOW_WRITES, WALLABAG_BASE_URL, WALLABAG_CLIENT_ID, WALLABAG_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for WALLABAG_ACCESS_TOKEN, WALLABAG_CLIENT_SECRET, WALLABAG_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
chmod +x "$DEST/scripts/new-connector.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.expect(preview.json).toMatchObject({ executed: false, dry_run: true, method: "POST" });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.loadConfig({ WALLABAG_BASE_URL: "https://user:[email protected]", WALLABAG_ACCESS_TOKEN: KEY }, []),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.