Skills/Glama/wafermap

wafermap@0.4.9

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients such as Claude Desktop and Cursor to use an encrypted local x402 wallet for AI agents, with tools to check balance and resources, call paid resources, discover and pay third-party x402 services, quote and execute token swaps, and view history under per-payment and daily caps." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher wafermap · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add wafermap
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
WAFERMAP_PASSWORDWAFERMAP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SystemRoot, WAFERMAP_HOME, WAFERMAP_RPC_ARBITRUM, WAFERMAP_RPC_ARC, WAFERMAP_RPC_BASE, WAFERMAP_RPC_POLYGON, WAFERMAP_RPC_ROBINHOOD, WAFERMAP_RPC_SOLANA, WAFERMAP_RPC_SONEIUM, WAFERMAP_TIMEOUT_MS, WAFERMAP_URL
Where it talks to
wafermap.xyz (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, x402.org, blockscout.com, basescan.org, solscan.io, arbiscan.io, polygonscan.com, arc.io, solana.com, kyberswap.com, geckoterminal.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, x402.org, blockscout.com, basescan.org, solscan.io, arbiscan.io, polygonscan.com, arc.io, solana.com, kyberswap.com, geckoterminal.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects WAFERMAP_PASSWORD, WAFERMAP_TOKEN only into requests to wafermap.xyz (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets WAFERMAP_PASSWORD=wafermap.xyz,WAFERMAP_TOKEN=wafermap.xyz -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/keychain.ts:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst merged: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = { ...process.env, ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hardening.test.mjs:219 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst wrong = cli(["keychain", "on"], { ...env, WAFERMAP_PASSWORD: "not the password" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli.ts:287 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…wm.discover(q, Number(a.flags.limit ?? 10)); for (const s of list) console.log(`${s.payable ? "●" : "○"} ${s.priceUsd !== null ? `$${s.priceUsd}`.padEnd(8) : "—".padEnd(8)} ${s.method.padEnd(4)} ${s.url}\n ${s.description.slice(0, 140)}${s…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebuild.mjs:15 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeexecSync("npx tsc -p tsconfig.json", { stdio: "inherit" });Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hardening.test.mjs:183 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst cli = (args, env) => spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, ...args], { encoding: "utf8", env: { ...process.env, ...env } });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hardening.test.mjs:215 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst status = cli(["keychain"], { ...env, WAFERMAP_PASSWORD: "" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.