video-understanding@0.1.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables users to turn GIFs, local videos, and Bilibili videos into timestamped, queryable, and verifiable frame evidence and event timelines, while passing extracted frames to the current session's model instead of calling an external vision API." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
EVENT_TOKEN_TARGETTIMELINE_TOKEN_TARGETConfiguration, not credentials: ANCHOR_MEMORY_CONFIG, ANCHOR_MEMORY_DIR, FFMPEG_PATH, FFPROBE_PATH, QQ_BRIDGE_DIR, VIDEO_TOOLS_URL, VIDEO_UNDERSTANDING_DIR, VIDEO_UNDERSTANDING_LOG_FILE, VIDEO_UNDERSTANDING_LOG_LEVEL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso bilibili.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names bilibili.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects EVENT_TOKEN_TARGET, TIMELINE_TOKEN_TARGET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const blocked = await assertSafeMediaUrl('http://192.168.1.10/video.mp4');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.const result = await assertSafeMediaUrl('https://user:[email protected]/a.mp4');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const allowed = await assertSafeMediaUrl('https://1.1.1.1/video.mp4');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.const allowed = await assertSafeMediaUrl('https://1.1.1.1/video.mp4');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.const allowed = await assertSafeMediaUrl('https://1.1.1.1/a.mp4');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.for (const url of ['file:///etc/passwd', 'ftp://example.com/a.mp4', 'javascript:alert(1)', 'data:video/mp4;base64,AAAA']) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const allowed = await assertSafeMediaUrl('https://1.1.1.1/a.mp4');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.