vcf-automation-mcp@0.2.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to call VCF Automation 9 REST operations as individual tools across 16 services, including deployments, catalog items, blueprints, policies, and IaaS resources. It also supports service-account setup, automatic token refresh, read-only filtering, and selective service loading." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
VCFA_API_TOKENVCFA_AUTH_MODEVCFA_BEARER_TOKENVCFA_PASSWORDVCFA_REFRESH_TOKENVCFA_TOKENVCFA_TOKEN_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: GEN_MAX_DEPTH, VCFA_CLIENT_ID, VCFA_CLOUDAPI_VERSION, VCFA_DOMAIN, VCFA_EXCLUDE_SERVICES, VCFA_HOST, VCFA_INSECURE, VCFA_MAX_RESPONSE_CHARS, VCFA_ORG, VCFA_READ_ONLY, VCFA_SERVICES, VCFA_TENANT, VCFA_TIMEOUT_MS, VCFA_TOOL_FILTER, VCFA_URL, VCFA_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso vmw.lab, example.lab — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names vmw.lab, example.lab as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VCFA_API_TOKEN, VCFA_AUTH_MODE, VCFA_BEARER_TOKEN, VCFA_PASSWORD, VCFA_REFRESH_TOKEN, VCFA_TOKEN, VCFA_TOKEN_FILE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
…ding access to operations with Event Broker.","contact":{"name":"VMware","url":"https://www.vmware.com/","email":"[email protected]"},"license":{"name":"Copyright (c) 2025 Broadcom, Inc. All Rights Res…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."x-vcloud-restricted" : "Proxy tokens are visible only to the owner of the token. Extension tokens are visible only on creation."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ТheFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log('Windows: if the client still cannot find it, run "where vcf-automation-mcp" and put that full path');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.<div class="foot"><code>npx vcf-automation-mcp</code><span>github.com/imtrinity94</span></div>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."description" : "'Forbidden' when the user has no admin access rights."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: TMP, USERPROFILE: TMP, VCFA_HOST: HOST, VCFA_ORG: ORG, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."description" : "'Forbidden' when the user has no admin access rights."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."description" : "'Forbidden' when the user has no admin access rights."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.ТheFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."description" : "'Forbidden' when the user has no admin access rights."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.