Skills/Glama/universal-agent-recovery

universal-agent-recovery@0.2.2

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables coding agents to register tasks, report progress, save checkpoints, and report interruptions so an independent watchdog can automatically resume interrupted work from the same session or a saved checkpoint." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher nbhson · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 38 h ago
$npx skills add universal-agent-recovery
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.com, opencode.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 24 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
4.0sprocessdependency install exit 0
24sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-CLfZsj/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/universal-agent-recovery/dist/mcp/main.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
24sprocessscript backend runs setup only
24sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/generic-cli.test.ts:26 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceconst argv = splitCommand('myagent run "prompt with ; rm -rf / and $(whoami)"');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/generic-cli.test.ts:28 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceexpect(argv[2]).toBe("prompt with ; rm -rf / and $(whoami)");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/adapters/process-runner.ts:71 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// taskkill /T is the reliable way to kill the whole tree.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/generic-cli.test.ts:26 · Destructive file system command detectedconst argv = splitCommand('myagent run "prompt with ; rm -rf / and $(whoami)"');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/generic-cli.test.ts:28 · Destructive file system command detectedexpect(argv[2]).toBe("prompt with ; rm -rf / and $(whoami)");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/watchdog.test.ts:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 65 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

universal-agent-recovery@0.2.2 safety verdict: Verified (startup only) — KillerSkills