Skills/Glama/uex-market-mcp

uex-market-mcp@0.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables searching Star Citizen's UEX player marketplace with combined filters on item, quality range, age, price, star system, location, seller, title words and category, returning listings ranked by quality, recency or price with direct links. Read-only public data, requiring no account or secret." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher jbillochon · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3 h ago
$npx skills add uex-market-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
UEX_MCP_OAUTH_REDIRECT_HOSTSUEX_MCP_OAUTH_SHIMUEX_TOKEN or --oauth-shimConfiguration, not credentials: UEX_API, UEX_LOG_LEVEL, UEX_MARKET_CACHE, UEX_MAX_CALLS_PER_MIN, UEX_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, UEX_MCP_HOST, UEX_MCP_PATH, UEX_MCP_PORT, UEX_MCP_PUBLIC_URL, UEX_USER_AGENT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso uexcorp.space, example.org, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names uexcorp.space, example.org, claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects UEX_MCP_OAUTH_REDIRECT_HOSTS, UEX_MCP_OAUTH_SHIM, UEX_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/uex_market/catalog.py:139 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 never kill the serverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

No other findings across 2,358 lines in 19 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,106 tok
1 file · 19 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.