Skills/Glama/typst-app-mcp

typst-app-mcp@0.1.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables an AI assistant to read and edit online Typst projects, including managing files, projects, share links and members, and threaded comments, while preserving concurrent browser edits. Also compiles documents locally to PDF, PNG or SVG with file:line diagnostics and inline page previews." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher raindancer118 · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 13 h ago
$npx skills add typst-app-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TYPST_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TYPST_API_URL, TYPST_BIN, TYPST_E2E, TYPST_EMAIL, TYPST_OUTPUT_DIR, TYPST_SESSION, TYPST_SESSION_CACHE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso typst.app, typst.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names typst.app, typst.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TYPST_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/typst.test.ts:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(() => normalizePath("../etc/passwd")).toThrow(/Invalid/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 5,404 lines in 26 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈39 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.